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Original Article
The Central Role of Morality in
Perceived Humanness and Unselfish
Behaviors
Francesca Prati,1 Silvia Moscatelli,1 Paul A. M. Van Lange,2 Niels J. Van Doesum,3
and Monica Rubini1
1Department of Psychology, Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna, Italy
2Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, VU University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
3Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Leiden, The Netherlands
Abstract: There is ample evidence for the central role of morality in social judgments. However, research has not examined whether perceived
morality of others also drives perceived humanness, nor has it extensively considered its behavioral consequences. These issues were
addressed across two studies. Study 1 revealed that information about a target person’s morality increased his/her perceived humanness,
which in turn explained positive behavioral intentions toward him/her. Study 2 pointed out that information about a target person’s morality
increased unselfish behaviors toward him/her. This effect was explained by perceived humanness of the target. Implications of the relationship
between morality, perceived humanness, and unselfish behaviors are discussed.
Keywords: morality, humanization, social mindfulness, social judgment, prosociality
Over the past years, there has been considerable research
showing the main dimensions that individuals rely on when
making social judgments (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008;
Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Leach,
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). A key finding from this litera-
ture is that information about one’s morality plays a pri-
mary role compared to information on the other two
main dimensions of social judgment – that is, sociability
and competence (Leach et al., 2007) – in leading to favor-
able judgments and positive behavioral intentions toward
individuals and groups (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Leach,
Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2013). However, less is known about
the role of morality and the other dimensions of judgments
in predicting others’ humanness, which may serve to pro-
mote not just positive judgments, but responsibility for
the fate of others as well as their inclusion in our ethical sys-
tem (Bastian & Haslam, 2010).
Despite the importance of this issue, to date, research
has mainly focused on the tendency to perceive others as
less human than oneself, rather than on the conditions
under which others’ humanness can be enhanced (Haslam,
2006). As Pinker (2008) wrote, morality “is not just any old
topic in psychology but is close to our conception of the
meaning of life. Moral goodness is what gives each of us
the sense that we are worthy human beings.” In this line
of reasoning, can morality promote humanness “as the
essential good we can distribute to each other?” (Walzer,
1983, p. 31). Moreover, if dehumanizing others leads perpe-
trators to deny moral responsibility for their fate (Bastian,
Jetten et al., 2013; Kelman, 1973) and legitimizes heinous
behaviors toward them (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006),
would perceived morality of others increase their perceived
humanness and promote mindful behaviors toward them?
To address this issue, a first aim of the present research
was to examine the role of the main dimensions of social
judgment in predicting humanness. A second aim was to
explore whether perceived morality of others leads the per-
ceiver to behave in a prosocial way – in terms of unselfish
behavior – toward them, because of their increased
humanness.
The Primary Role of Morality in Social
Judgments
A consistent body of research has shown that individuals
rely on two main characteristics to form impressions of
others: warmth and competence (e.g., Abele, Cuddy, Judd,
& Yzerbyt, 2008; Wojciszke, 2005). Warmth refers to the
capacity to establish good relationships with others. Com-
petence is related to individuals’ ability to achieve their
goals. Recently, it has been shown that warmth comprises




















































































two distinct components: morality, which reveals intentions
to do what is considered right, and sociability, which
denotes the willingness to connect with others (Ellemers,
Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013). Moral characteristics (i.e., hon-
esty and trustworthiness) tend to be far more important
than sociable (i.e., friendliness and likeability) and compe-
tent characteristics (i.e., intelligent and capable) in shaping
person and group perception (Brambilla & Leach, 2014;
Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013; Goodwin,
Piazza, & Rozin, 2014).
Morality is rated as the most desirable characteristic for
an ideal person to possess (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li,
2007). An interesting case in point is that people see them-
selves as far more honest than an average other person, but
only slightly more intelligent (e.g., Van Lange & Sedi-
kides, 1998). People are highly sensitive to information
potentially revealing other individuals’ morality, which
has a greater impact than information on sociability or com-
petence on the global impression individuals form about
others (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011;
Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012;
Goodwin et al., 2014). Neuroscientific research has shown
that inferring trustworthiness from another’s face requires
less time than inferring competence or sociability (Willis
& Todorov, 2006).
Research has shown that information about a partner’s
morality has a greater influence than information about
his/her competence on expecting cooperative behavior
from his/her side as well as on behavioral intentions to
cooperate with him/her (De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999;
Pagliaro, Brambilla, Sacchi, D’Angelo, & Ellemers, 2013).
Moreover, the more a partner is perceived as moral, the
more individuals engage in behavioral synchrony with
him/her during interaction (Brambilla, Sacchi, Menegatti,
& Moscatelli, 2016). Additionally, facial characteristics
related to morality (i.e., trustworthiness) predict real and
concrete behaviors such as voting choices, sentencing deci-
sions, and dating preferences (Todorov et al., 2015). In par-
ticular, trustworthy (vs. untrustworthy) faces potentiate
experiences of momentary motor activity consistent with
approach to a greater extent than with avoidance (Slepian
et al., 2012). Faces perceived as highly trustworthy elicit
also greater prosocial behaviors than faces perceived as less
trustworthy (Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van Lange, 2013).
The reason why individuals are highly concerned about
morality is that this dimension, more than any other dimen-
sion, defines whether others represent an opportunity or a
threat (Brambilla & Leach, 2014). Thus, the primacy of
morality is related to its essential role in surviving and in
classifying others as worthy to be trusted and be concerned
about. In this vein, perceived morality may not just predict
evaluations of others but may also enhance the overall
impression of them as human beings.
The Denial of Others’ Humanness
Research has paid great attention to the “negative side” of
perception of humanness, that is, dehumanization (i.e., the
denial of humanness to others; cf. Haslam, 2006; Leyens,
Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Failing to see
other people as human beings serves to justify discrimina-
tion and leads to increased immoral behaviors, from dimin-
ished support (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Vaes,
Paladino, & Leyens, 2002) to overt aggression and violence
(Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013; Kelman, 1973; Viki,
Osgood, & Phillips, 2013).
For the purposes of the present research, we relied on
one of the two theoretical strands of the dehumanization lit-
erature, namely studies on infrahumanization (Leyens
et al., 2000, 2001). Leyens et al. (2000, 2001) were the
first to relate dehumanization to in-group bias by showing
that people attribute more secondary or uniquely human
emotions (e.g., admiration, regret) to their in-group than
they do to relevant out-groups. Haslam (2006) went further
by distinguishing between two different facets of dehu-
manization: the denial of uniquely human characteristics
such as the ones that distinguish human beings from ani-
mals (secondary emotions and intellectual abilities) and
the denial of human nature characteristics such as the ones
that distinguish human beings from automata (emotional
responsiveness and agency). Research has found strong evi-
dence for both forms of dehumanization across a variety of
intergroup contexts (for a review, see Haslam & Loughnan,
2014).
As mentioned, most research has focused on the conse-
quences of dehumanization for social behavior. Relatively,
little is known about the conditions under which the per-
ceived humanness of others can be augmented (Haslam
& Loughnan, 2014). If the exclusion from the protection
and privilege of the human group is based on the denial
of significant human traits, then the inclusion in the human
group should rely upon the endorsement of crucial charac-
teristics of humanness.
Morality and Humanness
Moral sensibility is considered as a uniquely human trait
(Haslam, 2006). It distinguishes human beings from other
living beings (except for Chimpanzees and Bonobos; see De
Waal, 2013), because the large majority of animals lacks
self-restraint in comparison with human beings. Sociability
and competence (as human nature traits; Haslam, 2006),
which are shared with animals, are instead not considered
uniquely human traits. Thus, morality may play a more rel-
evant role compared to the other fundamental dimensions
of social judgment (sociability and competence) in the
inclusion of others in the human group. In this respect,
2018 Hogrefe Publishing Social Psychology (2018), 49(6), 330–343



















































































a correlational study has shown that morality, more than
sociability, is perceived as a fundamental uniquely human
quality (Goodwin et al., 2014). Research on dehumanization
has illustrated the link between humanness and morality,
by showing that denying humanness to others reduces the
attribution of moral status to them (i.e., worthy of moral
concern, rehabilitation, punishment; Bastian, Laham,
Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011) and legitimizes past vio-
lent actions against them, reducing the perceived wrong-
ness of acts and associated guilt (Castano & Giner-
Sorolla, 2006).
Only a study by Riva, Brambilla, and Vaes (2016) has
investigated the effect of morality on perceived humanness,
showing that targets who were perceived as lacking moral
qualities (i.e., low honesty, sincerity, trustworthiness) were
attributed less human traits, and were in turn perceived
as feeling less social pain than highly moral targets. Such
preliminary evidence, even though it concerns the negative
consequences of lacking morality, seems to suggest that this
trait should play a key role in the perception of humanness
compared to sociability and competence.
Research Overview
The present research aimed at examining the role of per-
ceived morality, sociability, and competence of others in
predicting perceived humanness and unselfish behaviors.
To achieve this goal, two experiments were carried out.
In Study 1, we investigated the effects of information about
a target’s morality, sociability, and competence on attribu-
tion of humanness and approach intentions toward the tar-
get. As mentioned, morality is the primary source of
favorable judgments (Brambilla et al., 2011). Also, morality
is seen as a uniquely human characteristic, whereas socia-
bility and competence are not (cf. Haslam, 2006). We
therefore expected that highly moral target would be attrib-
uted higher humanness and would elicit higher approach
intentions compared to highly sociable and competent tar-
get. Moreover, we expected that perceived humanness
should mediate the effect of morality on approach inten-
tions toward the target.
In Study 2, we examined the effects of the information
about target’s morality, sociability, and competence on
actual behaviors toward him/her. To our knowledge, there
is no research on whether target’s morality may affect a dis-
tinctive human behavior, that is, behavior aimed to favor
the target in spite of the self. Scholars have claimed that
the inclusion in the human group guarantees that others
are treated with the same dignity that is reserved to oneself
(Bain, Kashima, & Haslam, 2006; Kelman, 1973). If infor-
mation about a target’s morality enhances perceived
humanness, it should also promote mindful or unselfish
behaviors. To test this hypothesis, we adapted the social
mindfulness paradigm (SoMi) from Van Doesum, Van
Lange, and Van Lange (2013), a decision-making task that
measures the tendency to act in favor of others and in spite
of the self by leaving or limiting choice for others. We
tested whether the attribution of humanness mediates the
effect of morality on unselfish behaviors.
Study 1
In Study 1, we experimentally tested whether morality con-
tributes more than sociability and competence in predicting
humanness. The manipulation concerned the description of
a target person in terms of high or low morality, high or low
sociability, and high or low competence. First, we expected
that a high- versus a low-morality target would lead to a
higher attribution of humanness (Hypothesis 1). Second, if
perceiving others’ morality enhances their inclusion in the
human group and inhibits negative attitudes and dehuman-
ization toward them (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006),
morality may also guide behavioral approach versus avoid-
ance tendencies, that is, the intention to meet and spend
time with people who are high in morality. Therefore, we
expected that target’s morality would predict approach
intentions toward him/her (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we
hypothesized that the effect of target’s morality on
approach intentions would be mediated by attribution of
humanness to the target (Hypothesis 3).
To test these hypotheses, we employed two different
measures of humanness: the ability to express uniquely
human or secondary emotions (i.e., admiration, regret;
Leyens et al., 2000) and the attribution of uniquely human
and human nature traits (i.e., citizen, thief; adapted from
Viki et al., 2013). The former, as indirect measure of
humanness, avoids findings to be obfuscated by social
desirability. Specifically, it concerns to extent to which par-
ticipants think the target is able to express secondary
(uniquely human) and primary (not uniquely human) emo-
tions. We predicted that secondary emotions (as measure of
humanness), and not primary emotions, would be attribu-
ted to a greater extent to a high-morality compared to a
low-morality target, regardless of emotions valence
(Hypothesis 1a).
The measure of attribution of uniquely human and
human nature traits instead is an explicit measure of
humanness that takes into account the two distinct ways
in which humanness is defined, that is, human uniqueness
and human nature (Haslam, 2006). This measure relies on
selecting at least 8 words out of a list of 20 human-related
and nonhuman-related words that participants think to
Social Psychology (2018), 49(6), 330–343 2018 Hogrefe Publishing



















































































characterize at best the target. We used mainly nouns (Viki
et al., 2013) instead of adjectives (Haslam, 2006) as mea-
sure of human nature and human uniqueness, to avoid con-
founding with the experimental manipulation that relies on
portraying the target person with adjectives (potentially
overlapping with the measure) in each condition. We pre-
dicted that participants would select more human-related
words for the high-morality compared to low-morality
target, regardless of valence (Hypothesis 1b). However, tar-




A total of 248 university students completed the study in
exchange for course credit. Participants who failed the
manipulation check of target’s high versus low morality,
sociability, and competence (n = 6) were dropped from
the study1 leaving a final sample of 242 (174 females, 67
males) with a mean age of 19.7 years (SD = 5.58). Partici-
pants were asked to complete a questionnaire about
impression formation. They were randomly assigned to
one of eight experimental conditions. The experiment had
a 2 (Target’s Morality: high, low)  2 (Target’s Sociability:
high, low)  2 (Target’s Competence: high, low) between-
participants design.
Procedure
After being greeted by the experimenter and filling out a
consent form, participants were provided with information
regarding morality, competence, and sociability of a female
or a male target person. Specifically, participants read:
“Here you will find information on a person basing on
descriptions made by people who know him/her.” Each tar-
get person was described by three trait adjectives, one relat-
ing to morality (i.e., honest or moral or trustworthy), one to
sociability (i.e., friendly or pleasant or sociable), and one to
competence (i.e., intelligent or competent or capable). The
traits were randomly selected from three triplets, each
related to one of the dimensions of social judgment (Bram-
billa et al., 2012). Depending on the experimental condition,
each target person was described as being either high or
low in each trait adjective (i.e., highly honest vs. little hon-
est). For example: “Paul is highly honest, not very sociable,
and highly intelligent.” Afterward, participants completed
the dependent measures and then were debriefed.
Measures
Secondary and Primary Emotions
Participants rated how often the target experienced 12 emo-
tions on a scale ranging from 1 (= infrequently experienced) to
7 (= frequently experienced). Specifically, participants rated
six secondary emotions (positive: hope, admiration, opti-
mism; negative: pessimism, regret, remorse) and six primary
emotions (positive: pleasure, surprise, attraction; negative:
anger, disgust, fear) presented in randomized order and
balanced for valence. This measure was adapted from that
of Prati, Crisp, Meleady, and Rubini (2016) and Albarello
and Rubini (2012). Ratings of secondary emotions
(α = .71) and primary emotions (α = .72) were then averaged
in mean scores.
Human and Nonhuman Words
Participants were presented with a list of 20 words.
Adapted from Viki et al.’s (2006) measure of infrahuman-
ization, there were 10 human (i.e., uniquely human: person,
citizen, mixed-race, civilian, with mental illness; human nat-
ure: explorer, friend, partner, aggressor, nomad person) and
10 nonhuman (i.e., animal-related: domesticated, creature,
puppy, beastlike, wildness; robot-related: precision, mecha-
nism, android, rigidity, robot) words, counterbalanced for
valence and randomly ordered across participants. They
were instructed to pick at least 8 words that best character-
ized the target. Then, we calculated two indexes based on
the sum of human and nonhuman words selected by each
participant (ranging from 0 to 8 points).
Approach Intentions
Participants rated six items adapted from Mackie, Devos,
and Smith’s (2000) measure of behavioral intentions. They
assessed the extent to which the participants were willing to
“oppose,” “confront,” “argue with,” “talk with,” “spend
time with,” and “find out more about” the target (1 = not
at all; 7 = very much). Items 1–3 were reversed-coded, such
that higher scores on each item represented positive behav-
ioral intensions. The six items were then collapsed into a
single composite score (α = .86).
Manipulation Checks
To ensure that the traits employed to describe the targets
were interpreted by participants as related to one of the
1 Six participants were excluded on the basis of their answers to a manipulation check aimed to detect whether they remembered correctly how
the target was depicted. They were asked to indicate whether the target was described as high (= 2) or low (= 1) on each of the three specific
characteristics reported in their experimental condition. Specifically, two of the six participants who were assigned to the high-sociability
condition reported that the target was low (= 1) in sociability, whereas two of them reported that the target was low in competence (= 1), when
the target was highly competent. One of the six participants who was assigned to the high-morality condition reported that the target was low
(= 1) in morality. Finally, one participant reported that the target was high in sociability when the target presented was little sociable.
2018 Hogrefe Publishing Social Psychology (2018), 49(6), 330–343



















































































three main dimensions of social judgment, they completed
manipulation check measures, “to what extent is the target
honest?”; “to what extent is the target sociable?”; “to what




Checks on perceived morality, sociability, and compe-
tence of the target were submitted to a 2 (Morality: high,
low)  2 (Sociability: high, low)  2 (Competence: high,
low) between-participant multivariate analysis of variance.
This analysis included all participants (also the 6 ones that
were excluded afterward, to test the effectiveness of the
manipulation) and, as expected, showed a multivariate
main effect of morality F(3, 238) = 162.78, p < .001,
η2 = .672. At the univariate level, the main effect of
morality was significant only on the morality scores,
F(1, 240) = 460.86, p < .001, η2 = .658 (other Fs < 0.97;
ps > .326), with participants rating the target as more moral
in the high-morality condition (M = 5.31, SD = 1.05) than in
the low-morality condition (M = 2.50, SD = 1.01), p < .001.
The analysis also yielded a multivariate main effect of
competence, F(3, 238) = 171.19, p < .001, η2 = .685. There
was a main effect of competence on the competence scores
only, F(1, 240) = 494.32, p < .001, η2 = .673 (other Fs < 1.21;
ps > .272). Participants rated the target as more competent
in the high-competence condition (M = 5.29, SD = 1.06)
than in the low-competence condition (M = 2.38, SD =
1.01), p < .001.
Finally, the analysis showed a multivariate main effect of
sociability, F(3, 238) = 148.79, p < .001, η2 = .652. The main
effect of sociability was significant only on the sociability
scores, F(1, 240) = 422.02, p < .001, η2 = .637 (other
Fs < 0.91; p > .340), with participants rating the target as
more sociable in the high-sociability condition (M = 5.40,
SD = 1.22) than in the low-sociability condition (M = 2.38,
SD = 1.07), p < .001. These findings supported that the
manipulation of morality, sociability, and competence was
successful.
Secondary and Primary Emotions
To test the role of morality on humanness, 2 (Morality)  2
(Sociability)  2 (Competence) between-participant ANO-
VAs were conducted on the two types of emotions.3 As pre-
dicted in Hypothesis 1a, high-morality targets were
attributed secondary emotions to a greater extent (M =
4.29, SD = 0.76) compared to low-morality targets
(M = 3.36, SD = 1.09), F(1, 233) = 62.31, p = .001,
η2 = .211. No other effects were significant, Fs < 2.20,
ps > .139. The analysis also yielded a Sociability  Compe-
tence interaction, F(1, 233) = 7.27, p = .007, η2 = .030. Pair-
wise comparisons (based on Bonferroni tests) showed that
high-competence and high-sociability targets (M = 3.56,
SD = 0.91) were attributed secondary emotions to a lower
extent compared to high-competence and low-sociability
targets (M = 4.02, SD = 1.03), p = .003, as well as to
high-sociability and low-competence targets (M = 3.91,
SD = 1.09), p = .035. No other comparisons were significant,
ps > .093.4
High-morality targets were attributed primary emotions
to a lower extent (M = 4.30, SD = 0.72) compared to low-
morality targets (M = 4.51, SD = 0.76), F(1, 233) = 5.09,
p = .025, η2 = .021, whereas high-sociability targets were
attributed primary emotions to a greater extent (M = 4.76,
SD = 0.57) compared to low-sociability targets (M = 4.05,
SD = 0.72), F(1, 233) = 70.88, p = .001, η2 = .233 (see
Table 1). The effect on primary emotions was larger for
sociability, Cohen’s d = 1.09, compared to morality manip-
ulations, d = 0.28. No other effects were significant,
Fs < 1.11, ps > .292.
2 The following DOI gives access to the repository in which datasets of the present research are permanently stored: https://doi.org/10.6084/
m9.figshare.6226991.
3 Given that there were no consistent effects of participants’ gender and target gender on this and the other dependent variables of Study 1,
participants’ gender and target gender were not included in the analyses.
4 Additional analyses showed no significant difference between positive (M = 3.85, SD = 1.05) and negative (M = 3.82, SD = 1.14) secondary
emotions, t(241) = 1.75, p = .536. Further ANOVAs considering positive and negative emotions separately supported the primary role of morality
on secondary emotions, regardless of the valence. Results of positive secondary emotions showed the same findings of overall emotions, that is,
main effect of morality, F(1, 233) = 54.87, p = .001, η2 = .191, and Sociability  Competence interaction, F(1, 233) = 8.10, p = .005, η2 = .034.
Similarly, results of negative secondary emotions showed a main effect of morality, F(1, 233) = 55.66, p = .001, η2 = .193. There was also a
significant effect of sociability, with low-sociability targets (M = 3.99, SD = 1.12) being attributed negative secondary emotions to a higher extent
compared to high-sociability targets (M = 3.65, SD = 1.14), F (1, 233) = 5.93, p = .016, η2 = .025. There was also a Sociability  Competence
interaction, F(1, 233) = 5.12, p = .025, η2 = .022. Pairwise comparisons showed that high-competence and high-sociability targets (M = 3.47,
SD = 1.08) were attributed negative emotions to a lower extent compared to high-competence and low-sociability targets (M = 4.06, SD = 1.04),
p = .001. No other effects were significant, ps > .190.
Table 1. Pearson’s correlations between all measures (Study 1)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Secondary emotions – .049 .331** .212** .345**
2. Primary emotions – .193* .003 .074
3. Human words – .159* .193**
4. Nonhuman words – .058
5. Approach intentions –
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Human and Nonhuman Words
Support for Hypothesis 1b on the role of morality in enhanc-
ing perceived humanness of the target comes from
2 (Morality)  2 (Sociability)  2 (Competence) between-
participant ANOVAs on human and nonhuman words. As
expected, high-morality targets were associated to a higher
number of human words (M = 4.37, SD = 1.60) compared to
low-morality targets (M = 3.50, SD = 1.54), F(1, 234) = 18.23,
p < .001, η2 = .073. High-sociability targets were also asso-
ciated to a higher number of human words (M = 4.16,
SD = 1.48) compared to low-sociability targets (M = 3.72,
SD = 1.74), F(1, 234) = 5.03, p = .026, η2 = .021. The effect
was larger for morality, Cohen’s d = 0.54, compared to
sociability, d = 0.26. No main effect of competence was
found, F(1, 234) = 1.31, p = .253. The analysis also yielded
a two-way interaction between morality and competence,
F(1, 234) = 4.48, p = .035, η2 = .019 (see Figure 1). High-
morality and low-competence targets were associated to a
higher number of human words compared to low-morality
and low-competence targets, p = .001. High-morality and
low-competence targets were associated to more human
words than high-morality and high-competence targets,
p = .020. No other comparisons were significant, p = .123.
With respect to nonhuman words, high-morality targets
were associated to a lower number of nonhuman words
(M = 1.78, SD = 0.88) compared to low-morality targets
(M = 2.69, SD = 1.15), F (1, 234) = 48.41, p = .001,
η2 = .171. No other effects were significant, Fs < 3.33,
ps > .079.
Approach Intentions
A 2 (Morality)  2 (Sociability)  2 (Competence) ANOVA
showed that participants reported higher behavioral inten-
tion of approaching high-morality (M = 3.84, SD = 1.30)
compared to low-morality targets (M = 3.47, SD = 1.31),
F(1, 234) = 6.08, p = .014, η2 = .025. No other effects were
significant, Fs < 3.57, ps > .060. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was
supported.
Mediation
Table 1 shows correlations among secondary emotions,
human words, and approach intentions. We used Hayes’
(2012) PROCESS macro to test the mediating role of
humanness in the relationship between morality and
approach intentions. We ran two separate mediation mod-
els: one using secondary emotions and one using human
words as different measures of humanness. Both models
included morality as independent variable and approach
intentions as dependent variable. Significant mediation
was tested with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals,
where intervals that included zero were considered not sta-
tistically significant. For effect sizes, we reported the par-
tially standardized indirect effect (Hayes, 2012). Results
showed that the attribution of secondary emotions medi-
ated the effect of morality on approach intentions,
B = 0.41, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [.24, .63] (see Figure 2). In a
similar vein, humanness as the attribution of human words
mediated the effect of morality on approach intentions,
B = 0.12, SE = 0.05 95% CI [.03, .26] (see Figure 3). There-
fore, Hypothesis 3 was supported using both measures of
humanness.
Discussion
Study 1 added to previous research on morality by showing
that compared to the other dimensions of social judgments,
perceived morality promotes attribution of humanness.
The validity of these findings was supported by the con-











Low Morality High Morality 
Low Competence High Competence
Figure 1. Interaction between com-
petence and morality on human
traits (Study 1).
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High-morality targets were attributed both secondary or
uniquely human emotions and human words to a higher
extent than low-morality targets. Evidence on primary emo-
tions further supports the link between possessing moral
characteristics and the attribution of humanness. In fact,
primary emotions – that we share with animals (Leyens
et al., 2000, 2001) and imply therefore low humanness –
were attributed to low-morality targets to a higher extent
than high-morality targets. In a similar vein, nonhuman
words were associated to a higher extent to low-morality
compared to high-morality targets.
Unexpectedly, findings showed that high-sociability and
high-competence targets were perceived as less human, in
terms of secondary emotions, than targets high in sociabil-
ity and low in competence or those low in sociability and
high in competence. In the attribution of human words
measure, high-morality and high-competence targets were
perceived as less human than targets high in morality and
low in competence or vice versa. In our view, these
results may be due to a compensation effect (Kervyn, Judd,
& Yzerbyt, 2009) between two fundamental dimensions of
the stereotype content model (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske,
2018), which are competence and warmth (intended as
the combination of sociability and morality). Given that
highly competent people are usually perceived as low
warmth and vice versa, thus targets that were described
high in both sociability or morality and competence might
be perceived as “too perfect” as human beings. This might
have led participants to rate those who were low in one
dimension and high in the other as more human than tar-
gets who were high in both dimensions.
Another novel finding in this study is that perceived
humanness of the target person explained the effect of
morality on approach intentions toward the target. This
reveals one possible mechanism underlying the primacy
of morality in influencing social interactions (Brambilla
et al., 2011; Pagliaro et al., 2013). However, it remains to
be demonstrated that morality affects actual behaviors
toward targets, and do so by enhancing his/her perceived
humanness. This issue was addressed in Study 2.
Study 2
In Study 2, we sought to extend Study 1 by examining for
the first time whether a targets’ morality may elicit per-
ceivers’ unselfish behaviors toward the target. We mea-
sured choice behavior by adopting Van Doesum et al.’s
(2013) SoMi paradigm that focuses on leaving or limiting
choice for another person who is the last to choose. People
appreciate having choice (see, e.g., Aoki et al., 2014).
Therefore, leaving choice to others in spite of the self can
be considered a socially mindful or unselfish behavior.
Social mindfulness is defined in terms of the ability to see
implications of one’s choice for another person’s options,
and the willingness to act upon it by behaving in an
other-regarding manner – by leaving options for another
person (Van Doesum et al., 2013; for complementary
methodologies that focus on this distinction, see Misch-
kowski, Thielmann, & Glöckner, 2018). The present
study focuses on the commonly used measure of social









Figure 3. Simple mediation test of
the relationship between morality
and behavioral intentions through
human words (Study 1). **p < .001,
*p < .05. Morality manipulation is
coded 1 for low moral and 2 for high









Figure 2. Simple mediation test of
the relationship between morality
and behavioral intentions through
secondary emotions (Study 1).
**p < .001, *p < .05. Morality manip-
ulation is coded 1 for low moral and
2 for high moral targets. Bs are
reported in the figure.
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will to act in a prosocial or kind manner toward others (Van
Doesum et al., 2013; see also Lemmers-Jansen et al., 2018).
Thus, we first tested the effect of target’s morality, com-
petence, and sociability on perceived humanness of the tar-
get. In this study, humanness was assessed through the
attribution of secondary and primary emotions, because
this is the most widely employed measure of attribution
of humanness (cf. Leyens et al., 2007). As in Study 1, we
predicted that a target’s morality, compared to his/her
sociability and competence, would have a greater impact
on perceived humanness, with high-morality targets being
judged as more human than low-morality targets (Hypoth-
esis 1). We predicted that participants would behave in a
more unselfish manner toward high- versus low-morality
targets (Hypothesis 2), whereas targets’ competence or
sociability should not impact unselfish behavior. We also
expected that the attribution of humanness to the target
would mediate the effect of target morality on such unsel-
fish behavior toward him/her (Hypothesis 3). Given that
morality affects the global impression people have of
others, which in turn predicts individuals’ behaviors toward
them (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010), we included global
impression as covariate to exclude that the predicted effect
was merely due to the positivity of one’s global impression.
Finally, one may argue that to act in an unselfish manner
toward high- versus low-morality targets may be driven
by expectancy of potential reciprocation. To control for
potential effects of expectancy of potential reciprocation,
we entered this as covariate in the mediational analysis.
Method
Participants and Procedure
A total of 187 university students (135 females, 52 males;
Mage = 20.65; SD = 2.60) took part in the study. Target’s
morality, competence, and sociability were manipulated
as in Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to read
one of eight descriptions of the target and then completed
the dependent measures. Humanness was assessed using
secondary and primary emotions measure (Leyens et al.,
2007). Afterward, participants completed the global
impression and the decision-making task (as measure of
unselfish behavior). At the end, they completed the manip-
ulation check measures as in Study 1. No one failed the
manipulation check.
Measures
Secondary (α = .78) and primary emotions (α = .68) were
measured as in Study 1. Afterward, participants rated their
global impression of the target (1 = extremely negative; 7 = ex-
tremely positive). Then, they started a computer program
and performed the decision-making task.
Decision-Making Task
We drew this measure from the SoMi paradigm (Van Doe-
sum et al., 2013) that consists of a computer generated deci-
sion-making task. Participants always had to keep in mind
that they were playing this decision task together in a dya-
dic interaction with the target person presented to them in
the questionnaire. They had to choose one among three or
four objects in a series of different categories (we used 14
different object categories; i.e., umbrellas, wrapped gifts,
candy, sandwich). Per category, each participant was pre-
sented with two control and two experimental trials. In
the control lines, all three or four objects were entirely iden-
tical. In the experimental lines, two or three of the objects
but one were entirely identical, and the third or fourth only
differed in a single aspect (e.g., one yellow umbrella and
two green ones). The position of the object that differed
from the others was randomly assigned for each category
of object and across participants.
Each participant was asked to imagine that he/she and
the target would get to take home one of the three or four
objects. It was emphasized that the objects would not be
replaced; once chosen by the participant, an object would
no longer be available to the target. The rationale behind
this paradigm assumes that if the participant chooses the
object of which there are two or three, the target would still
have something to choose between (e.g., a green or a yellow
cap). As in Van Doesum et al. (2013), this was scored as
unselfish (i.e., socially mindful) behavior (1). If the partici-
pant, however, would pick the unique option, he or she
would leave the other with no choice but to take or leave
the other object (e.g., only two identical green caps would
be left); this was scored as selfish behavior (socially
unmindful) (0). The various categories were presented in
random order. A final score (i.e., a sum of unselfish choices)
was computed by summing the scores over all decisions,
with scores ranging from 0 to 28 (higher scores indicated
unselfish behavior).
Expectancy of Potential Reciprocation
Participants were asked the extent to which they expected
the target would leave them the opportunity to choose
among different objects, by leaving the unique object and
picking one of those that were of the same type. Partici-
pants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very
much) their expectancy of potential reciprocation.
Results
Manipulation Checks
As in Study 1, 2 (Morality: high, low)  2 (Sociability: high,
low)  2 (Competence: high, low) between-participant
multivariate analysis of variance showed main effects of
2018 Hogrefe Publishing Social Psychology (2018), 49(6), 330–343



















































































morality F(3, 177) = 43.25, p < .001, η2 = .423, of compe-
tence, F(3, 177) = 22.42, p < .001, η2 = .275, and of sociabil-
ity, F(3, 177) = 87.52, p < .001, η2 = .597. No other effects
were significant, Fs < 2.52; ps > .060. At the univariate level,
the main effect of morality was significant only on the
morality scores, F(1, 179) = 126.48, p < .001, η2 = .414 (other
Fs < 2.90; ps > .060), showing that the targets were rated as
more moral in the high-morality (M = 5.40, SD = 1.02) com-
pared to low-morality condition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.81),
p < .001. Similarly, there was a main effect of competence
on the competence scores only, F(1, 179) = 62.62, p < .001,
η2 = .259 (other Fs < 0.58; ps > .445), showing that targets in
the high-competence condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.29) were
rated as more competent than those in the low-competence
condition (M = 3.07, SD = 1.50), p = .001. Themain effect of
sociability was significant only on the sociability scores, F(1,
179) = 246.87, p < .001, η2 = .580 (other Fs < 1.47; p > .226),
with participants rating the target as more sociable in the
high-sociability (M = 4.91, SD = 1.15) than in the low-socia-
bility condition (M = 2.00, SD = 0.87), p < .001.
Secondary and Primary Emotions
As expected (Hypothesis 1), a 2 (Morality)  2 (Sociabil-
ity)  2 (Competence) ANOVA on secondary emotions
showed that high-morality targets were attributed sec-
ondary emotions to a greater extent (M = 4.58,
SD = 1.06) compared to low-morality targets (M = 3.68,
SD = 1.00), F(1, 178) = 31.63, p = .001, η2 = .151.5 A
three-way interaction between morality, competence, and
sociability, F(1, 178) = 5.14, p = .025, η2 = .028, was also
found (see Figure 4). Overall, pairwise comparisons support
the role of morality in predicting humanness. Moreover,
high-sociability, high-competence, and high-morality tar-
gets (M = 4.96, SD = 0.98) were attributed secondary emo-
tions to a higher extent compared to high-sociability,
low-competence, and high-morality targets (M = 4.08,
SD = 1.29), p = .002.
As in Study 1, the analysis on primary emotions showed
that high-sociability targets were attributed primary emo-
tions to a higher extent (M = 4.37, SD = 0.63) compared
to low-sociability targets (M = 4.03, SD = 0.77),
F(1, 178) = 11.03, p = .001, η2 = .058. There were no other
significant effects, Fs < 2.57, ps > .110. The analysis
also yielded a Sociability  Competence interaction,
F(1, 178) = 6.80, p = .010, η2 = .037. Pairwise comparisons
(based on Bonferroni tests) showed that low-sociability and
low-competence targets were attributed primary emotions
to a lower extent (M = 3.84, SD = 0.58) compared to
high-sociability and low-competence targets (M = 4.46,
SD = 0.63), p < .001, and to low-sociability and high-
competence targets (M = 4.25, SD = 0.64), p = .009. No
other comparisons were significant, ps > .303.
5 As in Study 1, positive (M = 4.19, SD = 1.20) and negative (M = 4.14, SD = 1.27) secondary emotions did not differ, t(185) = 0.514, p = .608. Thus,
we may be confident that social desirability (in terms of attributing more positive than negative characteristics) was not at play in the attribution
of these characteristics to the target. Separate ANOVAs conducted on positive and negative secondary emotions supported this assumption.
Positive secondary emotions were attributed to a greater extent to high-morality targets (M = 4.60, SD = 1.16) compared to low-morality targets
(M = 3.70, SD = 1.06), F(1, 178) = 25.71, p = .001, η2 = .126. There was a Sociability  Competence interaction, F(1, 178) = 4.37, p = .038,
η2 = .024. High-competence and high-sociability targets (M = 4.66, SD = 1.03) were attributed secondary emotions to a lower extent compared
to high-competence and low-sociability targets (M = 3.89, SD = 1.04), p = .019 and to high-sociability and low-competence targets (M = 4.01,
SD = 1.27), p = .031. No other effects were significant, ps > .430.
Negative secondary emotions were attributed to a greater extent to high-morality (M = 4.56, SD = 1.20) compared to low-morality targets
















Low Morality High Morality
Low Competence Low Sociability
Low Competence High Sociability
High Competence Low Sociability
High Competence High Sociability
Figure 4. Three-way interaction among morality, competence and sociability on secondary emotions (Study 2).
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High morality led to a more positive impression of the tar-
get (M = 4.62, SD = 1.03) compared to low morality
(M = 2.90, SD = 1.12), F(1, 179) = 127.57, p = .001,
η2 = .416. High-sociability targets were rated more posi-
tively (M = 4.19, SD = 1.53) compared to low-sociability tar-
gets (M = 3.42, SD = 1.06), F(1, 179) = 14.93, p = .001,
η2 = .077, and high-competence targets were rated more
positively (M = 4.08, SD = 1.31) than low-competence tar-
gets (M = 3.56, SD = 1.39), F(1, 179) = 7.83, p = .006,
η2 = .042. The effect was larger for morality, Cohen’s
d = 1.59, compared to sociability, d = 0.58, or competence,
d = 0.38. A significant interaction between morality and
sociability, F(1, 179) = 17.42, p = .001, η2 = .089, was also
found. Pairwise comparisons showed that high-sociability
and high-morality targets were rated more positively
(M = 5.11, SD = 0.95) than low-sociability and high-morality
targets (M = 3.95, SD = 0.72), p = .001. High-morality tar-
gets obtained higher ratings than low-morality targets in
both high-sociability (M = 2.85, SD = 1.17) and low-sociabil-
ity conditions (M = 2.94, SD = 1.09), ps < .001. No other
comparisons were significant, p = .832.
A two-way interaction between morality and compe-
tence, F(1, 179) = 4.31, p = .039, η2 = .024, was also found.
Low-morality and high-competence targets were rated
more positively (M = 3.26, SD = 1.19) compared to low-mor-
ality and low-competence targets (M = 2.55, SD = 0.94),
p = .001, whereas they did not differ from high-morality
and high-competence targets (M = 4.75, SD = 0.99), and
high-morality and low-competence targets (M = 4.49,
SD = 1.06), p = .599. High-morality targets obtained higher
ratings across high- and low-competence conditions,
ps < .001.
Decision-Making Task
When the target was described as highly moral, participants
chose a nonunique object more often, revealing higher
unselfish choice behavior (M = 15.48, SD = 3.36), compared
to the conditions where the target had low morality
(M = 13.94, SD = 3.64), F(1, 173) = 7.23, p = .008,
η2 = .040. No other effects were significant, Fs < 2.76,
ps > .098. This evidence supported Hypothesis 2.
Expectancy of Potential Reciprocation
When the target was described as highly moral, participants
had higher expectancy of potential reciprocation (M = 5.24,
SD = 0.75) compared to the conditions where the target had
low morality (M = 2.74, SD = 1.11), F(1, 179) = 350.48,
p = .000, η2 = .662. Similarly, when the target was
described as highly competent, participants had higher
expectancy of potential reciprocation (M = 4.41, SD =
1.48) compared to the conditions where the target had
low competence (M = 3.74, SD = 1.57), F(1, 179) =
22.47, p = .000, η2 = .112. No other effects were significant,
Fs < 3.042, ps > 0.083.
Mediation
Using Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS macro, we tested whether
humanness in terms of secondary emotions mediated the
effect of morality on unselfish behavior. The mediation
model included global impression and expectancy of poten-
tial reciprocation as covariates. Table 2 illustrated correla-
tions between the above variables. A significant path
between target’s morality and unselfish behavior was
found, B = 1.86, SE = 0.90, 95%CI [0.09; 3.68], controlling
for global impression and expectancy of potential reciproca-
tion. Morality also predicted the attribution of secondary
emotions, B = 0.58, SE = 0.28, 95% CI [0.05; 1.12]. When
secondary emotions were considered in the same regres-
sion with morality, the effect of secondary emotions
remained significant, B = 1.04, SE = 0.25, 95% CI [0.57;
1.51], whereas morality, B = 1.26, SE = 0.87, 95% CI
[0.46; 2.98], global impression, B = 0.27, SE = 0.25,
95% CI [0.23; 0.77], and expectancy of potential recipro-
cation, B = 0.45, SE = 0.29, 95% CI [1.02; 0.13], were
nonsignificant. Thus, secondary emotions as measure of
target’s perceived humanness mediated the effect of moral-
ity on unselfish behavior toward the target. Findings there-
fore provide support to Hypothesis 3.
Discussion
Study 2 added to previous research on morality by showing
that compared to the other dimensions of social judgments,
target’s morality promotes actual prosocial or unselfish
behaviors at interpersonal level, and that this effect is
explained by perceived humanness. This mediating role
of humanness was consistent controlling for global impres-
sion of the target and expectancy of potential reciprocation,
meaning that people behave in a less unselfish (thus more
prosocial) fashion toward highly moral targets because they
are perceived as human beings to a higher extent than low-
morality targets.
Table 2. Pearson’s correlations between all measures (Study 2)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Secondary emotions – .047 .276** .356** .386**
2. Primary emotions – .095 .086 -.069
3. Global impression – .172* .692**
4. Decision-making task – .145
5. Expectancy of reciprocation –
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Research on social perception has established the primacy
of morality in forming impressions of others (Brambilla &
Leach, 2014). The present research goes beyond this evi-
dence by revealing that the perceived morality of others
leads to consider them as highly human, and this in turn
predicts unselfish behaviors toward them. In a two-step
sequence of studies, we were able to show that the morality
of a target person enhances the perception of humanness
which, in turn, mediates approaching behavioral intentions
toward the target (Study 1). Switching to actual behaviors
(Study 2), we found that individuals behave in an unselfish
way to a greater extent toward high-morality compared to
low-morality targets. In fact, employing the SoMi paradigm
(Van Doesum et al., 2013), we showed that participants
were more likely to leave the target the opportunity to
choose between different objects, restraining choice options
for the self when the target was high (vs. low) in morality.
This effect was explained by target’s humanness. Overall,
this research highlights that morality constitutes a central
criterion of considering others as worthy human beings
and elicits unselfish behaviors which in turn might facilitate
positive social interactions.
From Morality to Perceived Humanness
Whereas Opotow (1990) argued that the denial of moral
values leads to dehumanization, our evidence showed that
morality is a fundamental criterion of humanness. If previ-
ous research has examined the link between the concepts
of morality and humanness by showing that others’ human-
ness impacts the evaluation of their morality (Bastian et al.,
2011), the present studies provide support for the “other
side of the coin.” In fact, the findings highlighted that
others’ morality, compared to their competence or sociabil-
ity, leads us to perceive them as more human, and also
enhances the perceiver’s unselfish behaviors toward them.
Notably, this effect was found using both a direct and an
indirect measure of humanness, namely attribution of sec-
ondary emotions and attribution of human traits. These two
measures allowed us to address multiple dimensions of the
humanness concept as highlighted by Haslam (2006), that
is, human uniqueness and human nature. Secondary emo-
tions (Demoulin et al., 2004) represent an indirect measure
of humanness, because individuals are not aware of their
underlying meaning. Conversely, the attribution of human
traits (Viki et al., 2013) is a more controlled means to assess
the extent to which individuals consider others to possess
human characteristics (e.g., friendliness) as opposed to
emotional states. Although on this latter measure we found
some unexpected patterns, the general finding that high
morality increases attribution of humanness was obtained
with both measures of humanness, supporting the strength
of morality effects.
It is also worth noting that high-morality targets were
attributed less primary (or not uniquely human) emotions
compared to low-morality targets. Given that morality con-
cerns the ability to control oneself and one’s own emotions,
this characteristic should attenuate the expression of
instinctive emotions. This evidence was consistent across
all the studies and supported the link between morality
and humanness. Thus, the present findings extend previous
evidence by showing that the morality of an unknown tar-
get not only leads us to a favorable judgment of the person
(Brambilla et al., 2012), but also to consider him/her as a
worthy human being, in terms of emotional regulation
(secondary and not primary emotions) and human cogni-
tion (human traits). In this regard, Gray, Young, and Waytz
(2012) proposed that ascribing human mind, involving both
experience (as expression of emotions) and agency (as cog-
nitive intentions), confers to an entity moral rights and
responsibility for its own actions. Our findings instead high-
light that when individuals are perceived as moral, they are
attributed human characteristics ‒ affective and cognitive
attributes ‒ to a greater extent.
These findings add to the literature on strategies to
reduce dehumanization and consequent positive behaviors
(Prati, Crisp, & Rubini, 2015; Prati, Crisp, Pratto, & Rubini,
2016; Prati, Moscatelli, Pratto, & Rubini, 2016; Prati, Vasil-
jevic, Crisp, & Rubini, 2015) by showing the role of morality
in attributing humanness to others, and, in turn, in treating
them in a socially mindful manner.
From Morality Through Humanness
to Unselfish Behaviors
Recent evidence has shown that inviting individuals to
think about morality increases their attention and improves
task performance (Van Nunspeet, Derks, Ellemers,
& Nieuwenhuis, 2015). Going a step further, we were able
to show that processing information on the morality of
another person has a strong impact on behavior, leading
individuals to favor the moral target over the self. In this
vein, morality works as a principle of cooperation between
unknown people, leading individuals to treat other people
as the self would deserve. In our study, the experimental
scenario let participants believe that after they made their
choices, a target person would choose from the options left
by the participants. Thus, they were made aware that they
had the first round to establish a prosocial versus a selfish
relationship. In fact, the SoMi paradigm concerns actions
that involve thinking about what others, and not just what
the self, may want (Van Lange & Van Doesum, 2015).
Social Psychology (2018), 49(6), 330–343 2018 Hogrefe Publishing



















































































Taking one of the nonunique options instead of taking the
unique option therefore concerns being unselfish or not,
safeguarding other people’s control over their own behav-
ioral options in situations of interdependence. Thus, this
paradigm captures a domain of everyday life behaviors that
concerns granting other people the same level of control
over their options as if they were the first chooser (Van
Lange & Van Doesum, 2015). Van Doesum et al. (2013)
suggested that socially effective actions like leaving or lim-
iting choice options for others require a process of both per-
spective taking and empathic concern. The present findings
therefore suggest that information about a person’s moral-
ity leads individuals to focus on options left to the person,
granting him/her a positive concern.
Would simple information processing of others’ morality
be enough to explain the results obtained? Van Doesum
et al. (2013) argued that individuals need to be motivated
to perform unselfish behaviors that allow others to make
autonomous choices. The motivation to perform unselfish
behaviors can be driven by individual characteristics of
the actor (e.g., high prosocial value orientation, empathy,
honesty–humility). However, given that the SoMi paradigm
reproduces a clear case of social interdependence, the char-
acteristics of the target person should also play a role in the
actor’s choices (Van Doesum, Tybur, & Van Lange, 2017).
Our research shows that others’ morality has a key role in
motivating participants to make unselfish judgments
toward them and that this effect is mediated by perceived
humanness.
Limitations and Future Directions
The use of student samples limits the generalizability of our
results. Future research could consider a more heteroge-
neous sample to test moderating effects of demographic
variables (i.e., gender, political orientation). The evidence
we collected speaks about interpersonal relationships, and
we know that there is widespread tendency to consider
one’s own group as more human than out-groups (Bain,
Vaes, Haslam, Kashima, & Guan, 2012; Leyens et al.,
2000). Thus, future research could examine the influence
of morality on perceived humanness at the intergroup level.
Would group members be prone to behave in an unselfish
way when their partners are highly moral (vs. low-morality)
out-group member? Does others’ morality lead to exceed
intergroup boundaries? Also, it is noteworthy that the mea-
sure of social mindfulness focuses on low-cost cooperation
(for a discussion, see Van Lange & Van Doesum, 2015). To
further test the strength of perceived morality, future
research could investigate whether the present results
extend to (monetarily) costly forms of prosocial behavior
as well as direct forms of aid.
Concluding Remarks
Past research has suggested that perceiving others as less
human than oneself may bring about hostility, aggression,
and violence, with moral exclusion being a plausible pro-
cess accounting for it (Bastian, Denson, et al., 2013; Kel-
man, 1973; Opotow, 1990; Viki et al., 2013). Our research
examined what makes people perceive humanness in
others and include them in one’s circle of moral concern.
It is an intense sense of morality that people also attribute
to themselves. This suggests that moral inclusion consti-
tutes a process that brings about the goodness in people.
Indeed, morality has a primary influence not only on the
perception of others as worthy human beings but also on
the tendency to act in a moral way toward them. This
may in turn elicit others’ moral behaviors toward the per-
ceiver as well as to other people, enlarging the circle of
moral concern (Singer, 1981). Thus, these findings are espe-
cially important for understanding why people tend to coop-
erate with strangers, as well as what is needed for strangers
to develop general trust, and for societies to promote and
maintain well-functioning democracies (see Balliet & Van
Lange, 2013). Overall, such insights may help find the path-
ways by which conflicts between groups, religions, and
nations may be reduced.
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